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U.S. Drug Manufacturers Beware:
Application of the PRC Antibribery Law to Drug Marketing and
Promotional Practices in China
RONG MOU1
I. INTRODUCTION
China's ongoing economic growth and tremendous market potentials have presented many opportunities for
American businesses, no exception to the pharmaceutical industry. According to a report issued by the Phar-
maceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), an organization representing the country's
leading research-based pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, up to April 2000 there are 17 major
American research-based pharmaceutical companies in China which enjoy a 12 percent share of the Chinese
pharmaceutical market of US$6 billion, or around US$720 million in annual sales. PhRMA member compa-
nies employ almost 20,000 workers directly in their operations in China and have invested some US$1 billion
1 LLM Candidate 2002, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Email: rmou@law.harvard.edu.
Student ID: 70553554.
1in China over the past decade.2 Doing business in China, however, the U.S. pharmaceutical companies are
in a business and legal environment that is remarkably dierent from what they are familiar with in their
home country.
Among other barriers, restrictions on the communication between pharmaceutical companies and physi-
cians/pharmacists recently caused signicant concerns of the industry. In a policy statement prepared in
December 2001, the PhRMA summarized these concerns as follows:3
\An additional market access concern revolves around a persistent practice in some
jurisdictions of banning pharmaceutical sales representative access to hospitals. Beginning in late 1999,
a number of Chinese provinces and cities began to enact regulations that prohibit pharmaceutical sales
representatives from entering jurisdiction hospitals with the intent to promote pharmaceutical products to
physicians and pharmacists. Although the measures may be well intentioned, PhRMA companies operating
in China believe that these policies are shortsighted, and do not suciently consider the long-term interest
of the physician and the patient in China."
The Chinese government's recent enforcement actions resulted from the market irregularities mostly commit-
ted by domestic Chinese pharmaceutical companies, but have had serious negative impacts on the business of
foreign pharmaceutical companies in China as well. Since the U.S. research-based pharmaceutical industry
2STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND MANUFACTURES OF AMER-
ICA (PhRMA), SUBMITTED TO THE HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE: THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION, April 13, 2000, at http://www.phrma.org.
3SUMBISSION OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA (PhRMA) FOR
THE NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS (NTE) 2002 (the \PhRMA NTE
Submission"), December 17, 2001, at http://www.phrma.org.
2has long employed the communications with prescribing physicians by sales representatives as an eective
and ecient method of promotion and marketing, these enforcement actions may substantially reduce the
U.S. pharmaceutical manufacturers' competitiveness. The PhRMA report estimates:
\[We] are concerned that these rules diminish the role of the pharmaceutical sales representative, and
signicantly impair the ability of pharmaceutical companies to:

Ensure that prescribing physicians are fully informed on
the proper use of medications.
 Obtain key information on the use and adverse events of launched products: not all adverse events can
be monitored in post-marketing studies. Quite a number of adverse events come under the form of questions
from the doctor to the sales representative who report to the medical departments in the pharmaceutical
companies.
 Keep the physician informed on the latest advances and developments in key therapeutic elds.
 Obtain important feedback from physicians, pharmacists and hospital administrators on their personal
development needs and interests.
The Chinese government's enforcement actions are based on a roughly-drafted set of regulations targeting the
corrupt practices in general commercial transactions, and other rules that are particularly applicable to the
health care industry. In this article, these regulations are collectively termed as the \PRC antibribery law."
In the following sections of this article, we will examine the background for the Chinese government to initiate
stringent scrutiny over the health care industry (Section II), and then analyze the pitfalls and loopholes of the
3PRC antibribery law (Section III) and its application to the U.S. pharmaceutical manufacturers' promotional
and marketing activities in China (Section IV). We will also briey discuss the guidelines provided by the
American Medical Association (AMA) and the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
Associations (IFPMA) which might be of some reference to U.S. companies' China operations (Section V),
and propose certain responding strategies for the industry and rules-changing suggestions for the regulator
(Section VI).
II. BACKGROUND
China's record in improving the health status of its population in a relatively short period of time is im-
pressive.4 In urban areas, health insurance systems established in the 1950s covered most medical costs for
employees and retirees of government agencies and state-owned enterprises, and their dependants. Some
kind of comprehensive health insurance benets covered about 50 percent of urban residents. In rural areas,
the rural cooperative medical system (CMS) was developed. This system required all commune members to
contribute to a group medical fund, thus placing medical expenses on the commune rather than on an indi-
vidual or a single family. Under this system, rural health stations delivered basic medical services, dispensed
medications and provided partial reimbursement for services received at township and county hospitals. At
its peak, the CMS covered 90 percent of the rural population.5
4As an indicator of progress, infant mortality rates were 200 per 1,000 live births in 1949 when the Communists took power,
but had dropped to 33 per 1,000 by 1997. Average life expectancy was only 35 years in 1949, but had reached 70 by the 1990s.
Most of this progress can be attributed to government investments in public health and preventive medicine, immunizations,
hygiene and sanitation. See Christine Beasley, Health Care: The Sick Man of China, www.chinaonline.com, February 7, 2001.
5Id.
4Even where they functioned best, however, neither the rural nor the urban systems of health care nancing
and delivery were ideal by Western standards. There were problems of quality control, mismanagement and
lack of scal accountability at various levels of both systems.6 Therefore, the reform of China's health care
system has long been a priority on the government's agenda. Since 1990s, both the urban and rural medical
insurance systems have undergone signicant changes. The government funds have gradually withdrawn
from providing full medical coverage to government/state-owned enterprises employees and rural residents.
The burden of medical coverage has become shifted from the government to the private parties (private
employers and residents).7
The reform has unavoidably inuenced the interests of virtually everyone, and thus aroused heated debates
and complaints in many aspects. Over the recent years the cost of pharmaceutical products has been of
particular concern. According to a 1998 report by the U.S. Foreign and Commercial Service, drug costs con-
stitute 60% of health care spending in China, in contrast to 8% in the United States. Because the domestic
pharmaceutical industry is characterized by low R&D investment and sluggish innovation, price competition
has been the main battleground among suppliers. Hospitals, which dispense most medicines in China, have
relied on the sale of drugs to patients and their leverage over suppliers to maximize their revenue.8
The roaring drug prices have seriously preventing many Chinese citizens from accessing to eective and
economic health care services. In response to this situation, the Chinese government started its eorts in
reducing the price of pharmaceutical products and eradicating abuses in connection with the sales and pur-
chases of pharmaceutical products since the early 1990s.
In 1994 a series of regulations and directives were issued by the central government with the intention of
cleaning up corrupt practices in the health care industry. The government agencies involved in this endeavor
6Id.
7See, in general, the Decisions on the Reform and Development of the Health Care System, jointly issued by the Central
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council of the People's Republic of China on January 15, 1997.
8Lester Ross and Walter Hutchens, A Legislative Prescription for the Ills of the Drug Industry, China Law & Practice,
Volume 15, No. 3 (April 2001), pp. 20-24.
5are the Oce of Correction of Corrupt Industry Practices under the State Council,9 the State Development
& Planning Commission,10 the State Economic & Trade Commission,11 the Ministry of Health,12 the State
Administration of Industry & Commerce13 and the State Drug Administration.14
The government inspections since then have discovered that there were a lot of pharmaceutical companies,
mostly domestic Chinese ones, engaging in corrupt practices in return for the sales of drugs.15 Despite gov-
ernment attempts to clamp down on these corrupt practices, however, the enforcement of antibribery law in
the health care industry has not seemed to be satisfactorily successful; therefore renewed and reinvigorated
attempts are being made to treat these ills.16
III. PRC ANTIBRIBERY LAW
Unfair Competition Law
9The State Council is the central government of the People's Republic of China. The Oce of Correction of Corrupt Industry
Practices is a permanent inter-ministry agency directly under the State Council charged with inspection and correction of
\corrupt industry practices" of a wide range of industries. It has the ministerial status within the government hierarchy.
10The State Development & Planning Commission is one of the two most important \macro-controlling" departments under
the State Council. Among its responsibilities is setting the price framework of the pharmaceutical products that are statutorily
under the control of the government.
11The State Economic & Trade Commission is the other most important \macro-controlling" department and has extensive
responsibilities ranging from formulating industrial policies to regulating the market order.
12The Ministry of Health is the top regulator of the health care industry and charged with the regulation of all hospitals and
physicians in China.
13The State Administration of Industry & Commerce is the government agency charged with, among other things, regulating
fair trading, protecting consumer interests, and drafting legislation for commerce and industry. It is the major enforcement
agency of the competition law. See detailed discussion below in Section III of this article.
14The State Drug Administration is the top regulatory body of the pharmaceutical industry. It supervises the development,
licensing, manufacturing, marketing and consumption of drugs, medical devices and biotechnology products in China.
15See Circular on Further Strengthening the Administration on Pharmaceutical Products, issued by
the State Council of the People's Republic of China, September 29, 1994. Also see
Circular on Continuing to Rectify and Regulate the Production and Marketing of Pharmaceutical Products and Strengthening the Administration on Pharmaceutical Products,
issued by the State Counsel of the People's Republic of China, April 16, 1996. These two \Circulars" briey summarized the
periodic results of the government's inspection and enforcement actions and requested further actions.
16See 2001 Implementation Opinions on Correction of Corrupt Practices in Purchases and Sales of Pharmaceutical Products,
jointly issued by the State Council's Oce of Correction of Corrupt Industry Practices, the State Development & Planning
Commission, the State Economic & Trade Commission, the Ministry of Health, the State Administration of Industry &
Commerce and the State Drug Administration on May 22, 2001. Also see the PhRMA NTE Submission, supra note 2.
6It was not until the early 1990s saw the introduction of the PRC Law Against Unfair Competition (the \Un-
fair Competition Law").17 The Unfair Competition Law was enacted to \safeguard the healthy development
of the socialist market economy" and to restrain \unfair competition."18 It denes \unfair competition" as:
\Acts of business operators that, contravening the provisions of this Law, damage the lawful
rights and interests of other business operators or disturb the social or economic order."19
When challenging the promotional and marketing practices of pharmaceutical manufacturers, the enforce-
ment agencies generally claim that such practices are in violation of the provisions pertinent to \commercial
bribery" contained in the Unfair Competition Law. Commercial bribery, as one of the \unfair competition
practices" enumerated by the Unfair Competition Law, is loosely dened as:
\The use of valuables or other means by a business operator to bribe the other transaction party
in order to secure the sale or purchase of goods." 20
The pitfalls in this wording are immediately apparent, for example, the circular use of \bribe" to dene
bribery. It is also unclear about the meanings of \valuables" and \other means" employed to bribe.
The Unfair Competition Law authorizes the State Administration of Industry and Commerce (SAIC) as the
17Promulgated by the 8th Standing Committee of the PRC National People's Congress on September 2, 1993 and eective
as of December 1, 1993.
18Unfair Competition Law, art.1.
7enforcement agency of the law.21 The Fair Trading Bureau of the SAIC applies the Unfair Competition Law
by means of administrative enforcement measures available to the SAIC under administrative procedural
law.22 The SAIC may investigate irregularities or violations of the law on its own initiative, or it can respond
to complaints received from outside parties.23
To implement Article 8 the Unfair Competition Law, the SAIC issued the Provisions on Prohibition of Commercial Bribery
on November 15, 1996 (the \SAIC Commercial Bribery Provisions"). It was made clear in the SAIC Com-
mercial Bribery Provisions that \valuables," as used in Article 8 of the Unfair Competition Law, refers to any
valuables \in cash or in kind, including payments under the guise of promotion, advertisement, sponsorship,
grants for scientic research, service fees, consulting fees or commissions, as well as the reimbursement of
various expenses."24 The \other means" used in Article 8 of the Unfair Competition Law refers to \provision
of benets other than valuables in cash and in kind," such as oer of all expenses-paid vacations within China
and overseas, etc.25
Article 8 of the Unfair Competition Law also deals with kickbacks and draws a line between kickbacks and
other legitimate business incentive arrangements such as rebates and commissions. The law reads:
21Unfair Competition Law, art.3.
22The PRC Law on Administrative Punishment was promulgated by the PRC National People's Congress on March 17, 1996
and became eective as of October 1, 1996 (the \Administrative Punishment Law"). Article 8 of the Administrative Punishment
Law denes the dierent categories of administrative punishment as being: 1) Warnings; 2) Fines; 3) Conscation of illegal
income or illegal assets; 4) Order to cease production and business; 5) Suspension or cancellation of permit or license; 6)
Administrative detention (only can be enforced by the Police Department); and 7) Other administrative punishments specied
by laws and regulations.
23Unfair Competition Law, arts.16, 4.
24The SAIC Commercial Bribery Provisions, art.2.
25Id.
8\Any kickbacks provided o-the-book and covertly to the other transaction party or its individual employee
shall be treated as oer of bribes. The acceptance by the other transaction party or its individual employee
of the kickbacks o-the-book and covertly shall be treated as the acceptance of bribes.
A business operator may, in an express manner, provide rebates to the other transaction party in the
sales and purchases, and provide commissions to the middleman. The rebates provided to the other
transaction party and the commissions provided to the middleman must be truthfully recorded on the
books by the business operator. The recipient of the rebates or commissions shall truthfully record on its
book the rebates and commissions." 26
Here the law sets two parameters to characterize a payment as kickback: \o-the-book" and \covertly"
provided. The dierent between kickbacks and rebates or commissions is whether they are duly recorded on
the books of both the provider and the recipient. It should be noted, however, that these two parameters
are only applicable to kickbacks. In other words, if an action falls into the category of bribery stipulated
by the rst sentence of Article 8 (\The use of valuables or other means by a business operator to bribe the
other transaction party in order to secure the sale or purchase of goods"), there is no requirement for it being
provided o-the-book and covertly.
Article 22 of the Unfair Competition Law provides that the SAIC may impose two types of administra-
tive sanctions on any violations of Article 8 that do not constitute a crime: (1) a ne in the amount of
RMB10,000 to RMB200,000 (approximately US$1,200 to US$24,000, and/or (2) conscation of any illegal
gains generated from the bribing practices.27
27Unfair Competition Law, art.22.
9Drug Administration Law
Another set of antibribery rules applicable to the pharmaceutical industry is contained in the PRC Law on Drug Administration,
which was originally enacted in 1984. On February 28, 2001 the Standing Committee of the PRC National
People's Congress signicantly amended the law (the PRC Law on Drug Administration, as amended, is
hereinafter referred to as the \Drug Administration Law").
The Drug Administration Law strengthens the legislative foundation over pharmaceutical regulations, in-
cluding approvals, manufacturing, storage, packaging, prescriptions, advertising and pricing. Several changes
merely codify, at the legislative level, what had already been implemented through administrative regula-
tions or in practice. The Drug Administration Law, which has become eective as of December 1, 2001, is
applicable to foreign-invested pharmaceutical companies and foreign market participants even though do-
mestic issues within the PRC pharmaceutical industry and its evolving regulatory system largely drive the
amendments.28
The core provision of the Drug Administration Law against corrupt practices in sales and purchases of
pharmaceutical products is contained in Article 59. The rst paragraph of Article 59 prohibits the payment
of \kickbacks" or \other material benets" in drug sales and purchases:
28Lester Ross and Walter Hutchens, supra note 7.
10\Pharmaceutical manufacturers, pharmaceutical dealers and medical institutions are prohibited
from oering or accepting kickbacks or other material benets
o-the-book and covertly in the sales and purchases of pharmaceutical products."29
There is not express denition of \kickbacks" and \other material benets," but two parameters are indicated
here: \o-the-book" and \covertly," which are same as the provision of Article 8 of the Unfair Competition
Law.
The wording of the second paragraph of Article 59 is more problematic:
\Pharmaceutical manufacturers, pharmaceutical dealers or their agents are prohibited from of-
fering any valuables or other material benets under any guise to the responsible personnel, drug
purchasers or physicians of the medical institutions that use their pharmaceutical products. The
responsible personnel, drug purchasers or physicians of a medical institution are prohibited form
accepting any valuables or other material benets under any guise provided by pharmaceutical
manufacturers, pharmaceutical dealers or their agents."30
The distinction between the rst and the second paragraphs of Article 59 appears to be that the rst
attempts to attack the kickbacks provided o-the-book and covertly (as opposed to legitimate rebates and
commissions) whereas the second is directed at \commercial bribery." Similar with the relevant provisions of
the Unfair Competition Law, under the Drug Administration Law, the commercial bribes are not necessarily
provided o-the-book and covertly.
11Articles 9031 and 9132 of the Drug Administration Law deal principally with discipline and punishment of
violations of Article 59, including among others the providers and recipients of proscribed benets.
The antibribery provisions of the Drug Administration Law are also primarily enforced by the SAIC and its
local branches, with the assistance of the departments of drug administration in case of need.33
Ambiguity of Law and Confusion in Practice
The PRC antibribery law applicable to the pharmaceutical industry, as above analyzed, is ambiguous in many
aspects, and thus results in broad and discretionary interpretations by enforcement agencies and puts the
pharmaceutical manufacturers in a continuing conundrum. On the one hand, pharmaceutical manufacturers
{ who, after all, are in the business of selling their products for maximum prot { are pushed by the economics
of the evolving health care market to develop data showing that their products are cost-eective, and by
competitive pressures to sell more of those products than the alternatives made by their competitors. On
31Article 90 of the Drug Adminstration Law reads in its entirety as follows: \The pharmaceutical manufacturers, pharma-
ceutical dealers and medical institutions which oer or accept kickbacks or other material benets o-the-book and covertly
in the sales and purchases of pharmaceutical products, and the pharmaceutical manufactures, pharmaceutical dealers or their
agents which oer any valuables or other material benets to the responsible personnel, drug purchasers, physicians or other
relevant persons of the medical institutions that use their pharmaceutical products, shall be punished by the department of
administration of industry and commerce by (1) imposing a ne in the amount of RMB10,000 up to RMB200,000; and/or (2)
conscating illegal gains if any; and/or (3) canceling the business licenses of the pharmaceutical manufactures or dealers, and
requesting the department of drug administration cancel their [special] licenses for pharmaceutical manufacturing and dealing.
If the violations are serious enough to constitute a crime, the criminal charges shall be initiated."
32The second paragraph of Article 91 of the Drug Administration Law reads in its entirety as follows: \The responsible
personnel, drug purchasers, physicians or other relevant persons of the medical institutions who receive valuables or other
material benets provided by pharmaceutical manufacturers, pharmaceutical dealers or their agents shall be imposed upon
administrative sanctions by the departments of health or the medical institutions of these persons, and conscated illegal gains
if any. The physicians who committed serious violations shall be disqualied as practicing physician by the departments of
health. If the violations are serious enough to constitute a crime, the criminal charges shall be initiated."
33Drug Administration Law, arts.90 and 91.
12the other hand, manufacturers have little real guidance from legal authorities as to when pursuit of these
ends through nancial arrangements or other communications with their customers { many of which would
be both common and lawful outside the health care industry, and many of which actually may be benecial
to the health care professionals and, ultimately, the patients { will be treated as unlawful bribing practices.34
Specically, the lack of clear denition of \commercial bribery" under the Unfair Competition Law (Article
8, and the relevant articles of the SAIC Commercial Bribery Provisions) and the extremely broad prohibition
of \benets" under the Drug Administration Law (Articles 59, 90 and 91) have created a climate that could
inhibit normal and genuine promotional activities of pharmaceutical companies, including those that provide
educational benets to Chinese health care professionals and thereby assist in the development of China's
health care system. It is of great concern to the PhRMA members as they stated in the recent national
trade estimate report.35
This is not a hypothetical concern. In the recent past some members of the PhRMA have been investigated
by local Government agencies in China ostensibly applying rules against \commercial bribery" under the
Unfair Competition Law. In such cases a recurring issue has been where to draw the line between marketing
irregularities that could constitute
unlawful \commercial bribery" and, for example, lawful bona de sponsorship of the attendance by health
care professionals at educational symposia.36
34Such dilemma is also found in other countries including the U.S. See commentary made by Thomas N. Bulleit, Jr. and
Joan H. Krause, Kickbacks, Courtesies, or Cost-Eectiveness?: Application of Medicare Antikickback Law to the Marketing
and Promotional Practices of Drug and Medical Device Manufacturers, 54 Food & Drug L.J. 279 (1999).
35See the PhRMA NTE Submission, supra note 2.
36Id.
13IV. ILLUSTRATION OF INDUSTRY PRACTICES UNDER ATTACK
The PRC antibribery law leaves broad room for the government's enforcement agencies to apply it to a wide
range of industry practices such as gifts and sponsorships for scientic and educational activities, payments
for services (such as clinical studies), discounts other incentive arrangements, and so forth. These promotional
practices are well-established and commonly employed by pharmaceutical manufacturers in the U.S. In the
meantime, even in the domestic U.S. market, these practices are subject to very strict scrutiny by federal
agencies (such as the Department of Health and Human Services's Oce of Inspector General), and subject to
self-disciplinary rules set forth by professional associations (such as American Medical Association) to prevent
any abuse. In fact, while relationship between the pharmaceutical industry and the medical community has
resulted in important benets for patient care, there has been for a long time concern about the potential
negative consequences of the relationship. As early as in the 1970s, following Congressional hearings on
unprofessional drug promotion practices, \Examination of the Pharmaceutical Industry, 1973-74," Hearing
before the Subcomm. on Health of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93rd Cong., 1st & 2nd
Sess., Pt. 3(1974), the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association endorsed federal legislation to eliminate
such practices as giving gifts to physicians to encourage them to prescribe specic drugs. \PMA's Positive
Program," 36 FDC Reports (\The Pink Sheet"), no. 14, at A1 (April 8, 1974). Criticism of pharmaceutical
promotional practices has not abated, however.37
37PETER B. HUTT & RICHARD A. MERRILL, FOOD AND DRUG LAW, 2nd Ed., 458-459 (2001).
14Gifts & Sponsorships for Educational/Scientic Activities
On of the major promotional practices in question is gift-giving to physicians by pharmaceutical companies.
Included in this category are personal gifts (e.g., lunches or dinners, or tickets to recreational or entertain-
ment events), gifts that aid the physician or other health care provider in his or her practice (e.g., pens,
calendars, or medical textbooks), and gifts that arguably have features of both (e.g., grants to subsidize
the costs of professional education of physicians).38 Many gifts serve an important and socially benecial
function; some gifts, however, may have inappropriate eects and are therefore vulnerable to attack.
Pharmaceutical companies are also active in sponsoring medical conferences that have been developed by
hospitals, medical schools or professional associations. Their sponsorship often takes the form of a speaker,
general support, or specic underwriting grants and includes hospitality suites, dinners, and cash payments
to registrants to defray the costs of attending the conference. In some cases, companies will pay the full
costs for a physician to attend a conference in another city or another country and oer to pay for additional
days of vacation at the conference site. Some companies put on conferences with speakers who are selected
by the company and who discuss the company's products. These conferences are typically held at attractive
locations, and some physicians are own in with their spouses for a weekend of presentations, recreation,
and entertainment, all at company expense. Often, a company will direct its invitations at physicians who
are viewed as leading practitioners by other physicians in their community. The companies recognize that
practices adopted by these \leaders" are generally followed by their peers. Companies schedule individual
speakers to speak to groups of physicians over dinner at no cost to the physicians, and some companies will
38Thomas N. Bulleit, Jr. and Joan H. Krause, supra note 33.
15make cash payment to each physician who attends the dinner to compensate for the physician's time.39
Gifts and sponsorships are at once the easiest and most dicult to analyze under the antibribery law. In one
sense, it is easy to analyze this category under the antibribery law: because these items have economic value,
plainly are intended to encourage the customer to give favorable consideration to purchasing the giver's prod-
uct, they arguably would seem to violate the letter of the law. It is worthy noting that the PRC antibribery
law as well as the implementation opinions issued by the relevant government agencies specically render
unlawful any payments to physicians from industry under the guise of \promotion and sponsorship."40
On the other hand, however, the description of this category also indicates the diculty with the area of gifts
and sponsorships; obviously, long-standing sales and marketing custom both inside and outside the health
care industry encourages companies to be \nice" to their customers, and surely it cannot be the case that
every benet described above is rendered unlawful by the antibribery law. Indeed, some gifts and gratuities,
such as textbooks or meals with sales representatives, may benet patient care by giving physicians the
opportunity to learn more about a product and its uses.41 Furthermore, the sponsorships for scientic and
educational activities provided to the medical professionals by the pharmaceutical industry are undisputedly
benecial to the development of the medical profession and therefore good to the society as a whole provided
that they serve the genuine scientic and educational purposes.
Payment for Services
39The Council on Ethical and Judicial Aairs of the American Medical Association, Guidelines on Gifts to Physicians From
Industry: An Update, 56 Food & Drug L.J. 27 (2001).
40The SAIC Commercial Bribery Provisions, art.2. Also see the 1994 and 1996 Circulars issued by the State Council, supra
note 14, and the 2001 Opinions issued by the six government departments, supra note 15. Also see Implementation Opinions
on Strict Enforcement Actions Against Corrupt Practices in Purchases and Sales of Pharmaceutical Products, issued by the
Ministry of Health on June 1, 1999.
41Thomas N. Bulleit, Jr. and Joan H. Krause, supra note 33.
16Another more controversial category of promotional practices is payment to medical professionals for their
services.
In general, there are a large number of common arrangements in the health care industry pursuant to which
persons in a position to make prescription or purchase decisions also might be hired to perform services
for the manufacturer. Most obviously, physicians, who can prescribe the company's products, often also
are hired to carry out clinical studies for the company. It also is increasingly common for payments to be
made to purchase data concerning use of the company's products by the physician's patients. Moreover,
doctors and others are paid for serving as consultants and members of scientic or medical advisory boards,
for attending focus groups, and performing professional speaking and writing on behalf of the company.
In parts of the medical device industry, it also is common for physicians to serve as preceptors to other
physicians, demonstrating techniques for appropriate use of certain medical devices. All of these practices
raise issues under the antibribery law when the person is paid, whether a physician, pharmacist, hospital
purchasing manager, or other, is in a position to inuence the purchase of the manufacturers' products.42
There is the possibility that some such arrangements may be \shams," paying for services that are not
needed or are not actually provided; or that although legitimate services actually are provided, the structure
or amount of the compensation is such as to provide an inducement to prescribe or purchase the company's
products. In fact, many services arrangements between pharmaceutical companies and prescribing physicians
or purchasing medical institutions have been rendered unlawful by the Chinese government agencies based
upon the above reasoning. The PRC antibribery law and the relevant ministerial implementation opinions
do provide the legislative and administrative sources for these enforcement actions.43
42See the introductory description of the general practices in the U.S. market in Thomas N. Bulleit, Jr. and Joan H. Krause,
supra note 33.
43See supra note 39.
17Discount & Other Incentives
One of the most problematic and complained marketing practices engaged in by some pharmaceutical com-
panies in China is making bold cash payment to physicians or pharmacists conditional on their prescription
or purchase of the company products. In China, such obviously inappropriate payments are colloquially
called \prescription fees" or \entrance fees," and as a matter of practice are usually paid under the guise of
\discounts" or \rebates."44
Discount and other incentives such as rebates obviously are not illegal per se in the commercial world. The
pharmaceutical industry is also not excluded by law from engaging in these business practices when dealing
with its customers (i.e., the purchasing hospitals). The major problem associated with this kind of business
practices is that if the discounts or incentives are properly reported, and if they are specically designed
to unduly inuence the recipients' prescribing and purchasing practices. The PRC antibribery regulations
outlaw any payment to physicians or pharmacists made by pharmaceutical manufacturers \o-the-book and
covertly."45 The appropriateness of discounts and other incentives are also dependent on whether they
are provided in a manner that may induce the prescribing physicians or purchasing medical institutions to
overuse or even misuse the company products at the cost of the patients.46
44Id.
45See the detailed discussion on the PRC antibribery law in Section III above.
46The Ministry of Health, Implementation Opinions, 1999, supra note 39.
18V. THE AMA GUIDELINES AND THE IFPMA CODE
The lack of clarity of the PRC antibribery law and the likelihood of its discretionary application by the en-
forcement agencies require the industry take various curative actions for a less confusing and more predictable
regulatory environment in which they promote their products. The established ethical rules of the medical
profession and the pharmaceutical industry, both at the national and the international level, may serve as
good guidelines for company conduct, safe harbors from the attack of the antibribery law, and persuasive
reference for the industry's lobbying eorts towards the Chinese government. Among these ethical rules the
American Medical Association (AMA)'s Guidelines on Gifts to Physicians from Industry and the Interna-
tional Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associations (IFPMA)'s Code of Pharmaceutical Marketing Practices
are of the most importance and relevance.
AMA Guidelines
In December 1990, the American Medical Association's House of Delegates adopted the Guidelines on Gifts to Physicians from Industry
(the \AMA Guidelines"), which rst appeared in the Code of Medical Ethics in 1992. Over the years, the
AMA's Council on Ethical and Judicial Aairs has continued to provide specic answers to requests for
19clarication. The purpose of the AMA Guidelines is to provide a sound framework to minimize conict of
interests and to prevent the integrity and trust in the patient/physician relationship from being compromised
by promotional or marketing activities.47
The AMA Guidelines believes that even when gifts from industry have no eect on a physician's practices,
there may be a public impression of impropriety, especially if the gifts are of substantial value. The trust
of the public that physicians are dedicated foremost to the welfare of their patients may be undermined
when there is a possibility that the choice of a drug, device or other product is inuenced by the fact that
the physician had received a gift from the company that manufactures the product. For example, when
companies schedule their own conferences at resorts and pay for physicians and their spouses to attend for a
weekend that includes only a few hours of lectures and many hours of recreation, lavish meals and expensive
entertainment, it is dicult to view the conference as serving a legitimate educational purpose.48
The costs of gifts from industry to physicians are ultimately passed on to the public. In eect, then, patients
may be paying for a benet that in some cases is captured primarily by their physicians. Physicians should
not accept inappropriate gifts because the cost is ultimately subsidized by patients.49
The AMA Guidelines also recognizes that many gifts from industry to physicians result in signicant benets
to patients. For example, books and conferences contribute to the education of physicians, and meals at
medical meetings or conferences provide a forum for colleagues to exchange information. These kinds of
gifts can therefore be appropriate, depending on the extent to which the gift serves a function benecial to
patient care and on whether the same benets can be realized through less costly promotional activities.50
Specically, the AMA Guidelines state:51






Any gifts accepted by physicians individually should primarily entail a benet to
patients and should not be of substantial value. Accordingly, textbooks, modest meals, and
other gifts are appropriate if they serve a genuine educational function. Cash payments should
not be accepted.
2. Individual gifts of minimal value are permissible as long as the gifts are related to the physician's work
(e.g., pens and notepads).
3. Subsidies to underwrite the costs of continuing medical education conferences or professional meetings
can contribute to the improvement of patient care and therefore are permissible. Since the giving of a
subsidy directly to a physician by a company's sales representative may create a relationship which could
inuence the use of the company's products, any subsidy should be accepted by the conference's sponsor
who in turn can use the money to reduce the conference's registration fee. Payments to defray the costs
of a conference should not be accepted directly from the company by the physicians attending the conference.
4. Subsidies from industry should not be accepted directly or indirectly to pay for the costs of travel,
lodging or other personal expenses of physicians attending conferences or meetings, nor should subsidies be
accepted to compensate for the physicians' time. Subsidies for hospitality should not be accepted outside
of modest meals or social events held as part of a conference or meeting. It is appropriate for faculty at
conferences or meetings to accept reimbursement for reasonable travel, lodging and meal expenses. It is also
appropriate for consultants who provide genuine services to receive reasonable compensation and to accept
reimbursement for reasonable travel, lodging and meal expenses. Token consulting or advisory arrangements
cannot be used to justify compensating physicians for their time or their travel, lodging and other out-of-
pocket expenses.
5. Scholarships or other special funds to permit medical students, residents and fellows to attend carefully
selected educational conferences may be permissible as long as the selection of students, residents or fellows
who will receive the funds is made by the academic or training institution.
6.
21No gifts should be accepted if there are strings attached. For example, physicians
should not accept gifts if they are given in relation to the physicians' prescribing practices.
In addition, when companies underwrite medical conferences or lectures other than their own,
responsibility for and control over the selection of content, faculty, educational methods and
materials should belong to the organizers of the conferences or lectures.
IFPMA Code
At the international level, the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associations (\IF-
PMA")52 adopted the Code of Pharmaceutical Marketing Practices (the \IFPMA Code") in 1981. A major
revision of the IFPMA Code took place in 1994, recognizing the many changes in the market environment.
The IFPMA Code, summarizing the rules of conduct generally accepted by the industry worldwide, can serve
as another important set of guidelines for the U.S. drug manufacturers promoting their products in China.
In the meanwhile, the principles and specic provisions of the IFPMA Code may be more acceptable by the
Chinese government as a reference when drafting the supplementary legislation to the current antibribery
law.
The IFPMA Code acknowledges that the promotion of prescription medicines to health care professionals
52IFPMA was created in 1968 as a non-prot, non-governmental organization (NGO) and has since achieved consultative
status with many United Nations and other international organizations. The IFPMA was admitted into ocial relations with
the World Health Organization (WHO) in 1971 and is also on the NGO roster for the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the United Nations Industrial Development
Organization (UNIDO), the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the United Nations Children's Fund
(UNICEF) and the Council of Europe. The members of IFPMA are regional and national associations representing research-
based pharmaceutical companies and other manufacturers of prescription medicines. The PhRMA is a member of the IFPMA
representing the U.S. research-based pharmaceutical industry. See more information about the IFPMA from its ocial website
at http://www.ifpma.org.
22is a vital extension of the process of searching for and developing new and better means of preventing and
treating illness. Promotion and the dissemination of educational information ensures that the full benets
of the years of work and enormous expenditure of skill and money will be made available promptly to the
patients of the world. The voluntary adoption of the IFPMA Code in 1981 was in accordance with a key
objective of the IFPMA as set out by its Founder Members in 1968 in the Statutes (Article 3) which state
that one of the objects of the IFPMA is \to promote and support continuous development throughout the
pharmaceutical industry of ethical principles and practices voluntarily agreed on" and \to coordinate the
eorts of its members towards the realization of the above objects."53
The IFPMA Code is intended to dene universally applicable baseline standards of marketing practices. A
substantial proportion of the 51 member associations of IFPMA have their own Code of Practice. Some are
based on the IFPMA Code, but elaborated to recognize national circumstances and conditions, while others
are derived from versions which existed even before the IFPMA Code was rst introduced. All, however,
fully embody the principles set out in the IFPMA Code. Companies within membership of IFPMA Member
Associations are also encouraged to formulate their own codes that may include more specic requirements
and additional rules that must be observed by their own employees in conducting their own promotional
activities.54
Sections III and IV of the IFPMA Code, dealing with \symposia, congresses and other means of verbal
communication" and \hospitality and promotional items" respectively, are of most relevance to this article.
The IFPMA Code recognizes that symposia, congresses and the like are indispensable for the dissemination
of knowledge and experience, and provides the following safe harbor
rules for pharmaceutical companies to engage in such activities:55
53IFPMA Code: Introduction.
54Id.
55IFPMA Code: Section III.
231.
Objectives: scientic objectives should be the principal focus in arranging
such meetings and entertainment and other hospitality shall not be inconsistent with such
objectives.
2. Sponsorship: When a pharmaceutical company or association sponsors a symposium, congress or other
medical/health care or educational program:

The fact of sponsorship by the company or association
should be clearly stated in advance, at the meeting and in any proceedings.
Printed, audio-visual or computer-based material arising from such meetings
should accurately reect the presentations and discussions.
 Entertainment or other hospitality and any gifts oered to members of the medical and allied professions
should be secondary to the main purpose of the meeting and should be kept to a modest level.
 Any support to individual health practitioners to participate should not be conditional upon any obli-
gation to promote any medicinal product.
 If the program is accredited for postgraduate medical education by a medical or other professional or-
ganization, responsibility for the program content remains with the organization responsible for obtaining
accreditation for the meeting, and industry support should be disclosed.

Payments of reasonable honoraria and reimbursement of
out-of-pocket expenses, including travel, for speakers/presenters are customary and
24proper.

Companies should not pay travel costs of persons accom-
panying invited members of the medical and allied professions.
The IFPMA Code generally prohibits inappropriate benets provided to health care professionals, but
exempts promotional items of insignicant value and educational materials from the general prohibition.
Specically, Section IV.1 provides that inappropriate nancial or material benets, including inappropriate
hospitality, should not be oered to health care professionals to inuence them in the prescription of phar-
maceutical products.56 Making hospitality or other benets conditional upon past prescribing performance
is also precluded.57 Section IV. 2 provides that promotional items of insignicant value, provided free of
charge, are permissible as long as they are related to the health care provider's work and/or entail a benet
to patients.58 Section IV. 3 further provides that textbooks or reference
books/information, and other educational material may be given to health care providers if they serve a
genuine educational function.59
VI. CONCLUSION
56IFPMA Code, Section IV.1.
57IFPMA Code, Explanatory Note to Section IV.1.
58IFPMA Code, Section IV.2.
59IFPMA Code, Section IV.3.
25Given the facts that the health care industry of China is still under dramatic reform and restructuring, and
that the PRC antibribery law and the enforcement actions taken by the government agencies are still of the
developing character, in the short run the disorder and unpredictability of China's pharmaceutical market
and the regulatory regime will remain. To fully tap the attractive market potentials while avoid or minimize
undesirable government interruptions, the U.S. pharmaceutical manufacturers should consider designing and
implementing more eective and country-specic corporate policies governing their promotional and mar-
keting practices in China; in the meantime, continuing the lobbying eorts to urge the Chinese government
to clarify the existing regulation and set forth more safe harbors to accommodate the industry's concerns.
With respect to the provision of gifts and sponsorships from the industry to medical professionals, the cau-
tious guidelines set forth by the AMA Guidelines and IFPMA Code should be observed. In essence, the value
of the gifts and sponsorships must be appropriate and consistent with the genuine scientic and/or educa-
tional purposes, and any linkage between the provision of gifts/sponsorships and the prescribing/purchasing
practices must be carefully avoided.
With respect to the payment to medical professionals for services, pharmaceutical companies should demon-
strate that they do have a legitimate need for the services of the physician consultant or advisor. The best
evidence of such a need probably is that the company considers and acts (either favorably or unfavorably) on
the recommendations of its physician consultants. Another issue should be noted is whether the physician
consultants are compensated an amount that fairly reects the value of a service that contemporaneous
documentation shows they actually provided.60
60Thomas N. Bulleit, Jr. and Joan H. Krause, supra note 33.
26With respect to the discounts and other incentive arrangements, the single most important guideline is to
strictly abide by the relevant accounting principles and rules and have all of these arrangements duly recorded
on the company's accounting books. As previously analyzed, the dividing line between lawful \discounts"
and unlawful \kickbacks" is that whether they are provided \o-the-book and covertly,"61 thus good book-
keeping practice and the maintenance of an easily-checkable \paper trail" of these arrangements are highly
recommendable.
The U.S. pharmaceutical industry has also started to, and should continue to, engage in lobbying activities
to persuade the Chinese government to change or rene the relevant rules. The PhRMA has come up with
and publicized a set of detailed suggestions for substantiate and clarify the vague provisions contained in the
Drug Administration Law.62
In order to address the industry's concern about the potential for controversy about the intent of Articles 59,
90 and 91 of the Drug Administration Law, the PhRMA suggest that the implementation rules supplementing
to the Drug Administration Law63 specify as clearly as possible what conduct remains permissible. With
respect to the \valuables or other material benets" used in the second paragraph of Article 59 and the
corresponding sentences of Articles 90 and 91, the PhRMA argues that the objective of the law could be
achieved with minimal disruption of bona de promotional activities if the implementing rules were to make
clear that the prohibition on the provision or acceptance of benets refers to \inappropriate benets provided
to inuence the recipients in the purchase or prescription of pharmaceutical products of the providers,"
following the lines of the IFPMA Code and legislative norms of some other countries.64
61See the detailed discussion in Section III above.
62See the PhRMA NTE Submission, supra note 2.
63The Implementation Rules for the Drug Administration Law are under the amendment process to be consistent with the
recent amendments to the Drug Administration Law. The agencies charged with the drafting work are the State Drug Admin-
istration and the State Council's Oce of Legal Aaires.
64Id.
27The PhRMA also suggests setting forth specic exemptions from the attack of Articles 59, 90 and 91 of
the Drug Administration Law, which providers and recipients of benets could readily understand. For
example, the new implementing rules might expressly provide that Articles 59, 90 and 91 do not prohibit
the sponsorship of attendance by health care professionals at symposia, conferences, congresses, seminars or
other similar research-oriented or educational programs, publication of scientic papers and the provision of
promotional items of insignicant value and educational materials.65
PhRMA proposes that a specic exemption along the lines of the foregoing could be made even more precise
by providing that permissible sponsorships and materials are those that are (a) genuine in terms of purpose;
(b) not intended to induce any pharmaceutical purchase and prescription activity, (c) appropriate to the
expertise of the sponsored personnel and disclosed in writing to the responsible persons within the unit
of the sponsored personnel, (d) reasonable in amount to the extent of that required by the scientic and
educational purposes, and (e) properly accounted for in the books and records of the sponsor.66
65Id.
66Id.
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